for Critical Security Studies. One of the first propositions of WOMP was that, in contradistinction to mainstream, value-free social science, scholars committed to Aalternative world futures@ would focus their energies on the Aarticulation of values to be achieved by social change@-values which would then serve as the criteria for evaluating proposals for a better future. 5 Consistent with this orientation, WOMP scholars proceeded to draw on a series of Anormative classificatory schemes@, such Maslow=s need hierarchy which included food, sex, shelter, and security (Aself-preservation needs@), love and a sense of belonging (Acommunity needs@), and the needs for self-esteem and selfactualization (Aself-determination needs@). 6 The problem with this approach was that values were discussed without adequate attention to context, and this in two senses. First, the values specified were not articulated Ain the context of historical space and time@; the awareness that comes with an analysis of an historical setting that gives meaningful content to values was missing. Equally absent was an analysis of Athe dynamic forces of historical change@ -the >laws of motion@ of contemporary global society -which would allow for an understanding of crisis in terms of the relational contradictions which underlie them, and without which concrete strategies for collective action in pursuit of emancipatory change cannot be formulated. 7 In short, the first major problem with WOMP was its abstract utopianism -a utopianism which stripped its theorizing of its critical content no less thoroughly than had it retained mainstream, positivist social science=s commitment to value-freedom. It is true that critical theory
Acontains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherence picture of an alternative order@ thus allowing Afor a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order@. It is also true, however, that critical theory=s Autopianism is constrained by it comprehension of historical processes@; accordingly, critical theory Alimits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world@. 8 This WOMP failed to do.
A second problem with the WOMP efforts which merits the attention of critical security theorists was its elitism. As they rejected the value-freedom of mainstream social science, so too did WOMP theorists reject the instrumental conception of the relationship of theory and practice which stands at the core of positivist theories of society. 9 Instead, in keeping with the orientation of critical theory, WOMP scholars embraced an educative conception of the relationship of theory to practice, seeing in the education of ordinary citizens as well as elites the best hope for progressive change.
Unfortunately, WOMP theorists paid insufficient attention to the fact that not all forms of pedagogy are consistent with the critical commitment to Aengender self-knowledge and so to liberate people from the oppressiveness of their social arrangements@. 10 Specifically, with their view of people as essentially ignorant of the truths that would set them free, 11 WOMP theorists embraced what Freire has termed Abanking education@, a form of pedagogy in which Aknowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing@. 12 In contrast, a truly critical form of pedagogy is one which is fundamentally dialogical, and which sees the oppressed not as ignorant, empty vessels to be filled with objective knowledge, but rather as self-reflecting and knowledgeable beings whose self-definitions and understandings must form the starting point -though clearly not the endpoint -of the learning process. In short, by adopting a pedagogical practice which assumes the masses to be too ignorant Ato understand the present in which they live and the future that would be most desirable@, 13 WOMP theorists again negated the critical content of their contribution no less than had they conceived the theory-practice relation in positivistic, instrumental terms.
The WOMP experience is worth recalling for Critical Security Studies faces the same dangers. As in the case of the earlier WOMP theorists, it would be easy for critical security theorists to expend their energies formulating, in sublime abstraction, ever more comprehensive Maslowiantype value-lists, the achievement of which would putatively constitute Areal security@ for human beings, and thereby lose sight of the need to Aprove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the thissidedness of [our] thinking in practice@. 14 Put bluntly, if our intellectual work is not grounded in and connected to the real lived experiences and struggles of real people, its value will be minimal.
Furthermore, from a starting point which is not so grounded, it is but a small step to viewing ordinary people not as active and reflective partners in the process of emancipatory change, but as empty vessels to be filled with our objective truths, once again losing sight of the fact that it is not ideas but Apeople who change circumstances and that it is necessary to educate the educator, him/herself@. 15 If these are the pitfalls to be avoided, however, what kind of approach offers the best hope of doing so? It can be argued that a more genuinely critical -and hence, emancipatory -strategy is one which focusses on the more "empirical" question of how security issues are framed in political discourse. Here the emphasis would be upon exploring how different conceptions of security -both traditional and expanded -find their way into public debates; how specific values are made socially concrete in this process, and how people both act and are acted upon in the process of history unfolding. The concern here is with identifying the political projects different notions of security may serve and, perhaps most importantly, the role of security discourse in policymaking, implementation, and legitimation.
Such an approach to security questions steers clear of both of the pitfalls noted above. First, in its focus on the Aconcrete@ -as opposed to the purely abstract -it avoids the problem of utopianism, and allows for some understanding of the Alaws of motion@ of human society which makes emancipatory practice possible. Secondly, it helps to avoid the pitfall of elitism in that it sees people as active, knowing agents with the ability both to make use of critical knowledges to resist manipulation by societal elites more effectively, and to inspire and enlighten critical intellectuals in return.
As the proof of the pudding lies in the eating, I will now illustrate the merits of this approach by examining a concrete case: the evolution of security discourse in Canada. I will argue that, despite the appearance of a significant change in official security discourse following the end of the Cold War, the policy-determining notion of security retains much in common with that of traditional Strategic Studies. Accordingly, questions must be asked about the function of security discourses in the context of changing forms of state and world order.
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF SECURITY DISCOURSE: The Canadian Case
A member of the elite club of nations which constitute the G-7, an unwavering ally of the United States, and a self-identified "middle power" committed to multilateral management of the global order, 16 Canada provides a useful example of the evolution and role of security discourses in a liberal-democratic society.
One cannot but be struck, when surveying the evolution of security discourse in the Canadian context over the past few decades, of how great a shift has occurred. During the Cold War period official security discourse conformed closely to conventional, deterrence-oriented understandings of security. In the 1980s, for example, the Department of External (now renamed "Foreign") Affairs affirmed that "National defence is the foundation of a country's security.@ 17 In this period, official security policy and discourse reflected the assumption that in the anarchical context of international politics "the most serious threat to international peace and global human welfare was international communism and the strength of the United States was the primary bulwark against its spread.@ 18 It was this assumption, moreover, which provided "the underlying unity to such seemingly disparate policies as Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treat Organization, its close military and defence productions links with the United States, its expanding aid programme, its active role in peacekeeping, and its effective participation in international institutions" 19 It was in reaction to the official and very much traditional conceptualization of security that important elements in Canadian civil society organized themselves to promote an alternative. Indeed, it was in the context of public questioning of the traditional assumptions about the international order by emerging oppositional social groupings which led, outside of official circles, to a substantive redefinition of the notion of "security.@ Pratt has referred to this social grouping, which arose in the late 1960s and which remains active into the present context, as the "counter-consensus" -a collection of "internationally minded public interest groups", which exist in substantial number, Radicalization and expansion of the social base of the "counter-consensus" through the 1970s
and 1980s, most recently in the context of anti-free trade struggles, led to increased emphasis on the links between disarmament, economic development and wealth re-distribution, environmental policy, and democratization at the global level with radical change at the domestic level. In this respect the "counter-consensus" could be understood as forming part of an emerging "counterhegemonic bloc".
Of particular importance for the discussion here is the fact that the counter-discourse of the "counter-consensus" gave new life to the notion of "security". Significantly, the links of the official notion of "security" to support for an American-led hegemonic order were severed. Rather, "security" was recast to signify radical progressive change in terms of disarmament, economic development and wealth re-distribution, environmental policy, and the democratization of the foreign policy-making process.
The re-configured notion of security -now designated "human security" -is clearly in evidence in a document produced by the counter-consensus after a country-wide consultative process in the early 1990s: Transformation Moment: A Canadian Vision of Common Security. The inquiry=s list of co-sponsors reads like a virtual "Who's Who" of the counter-consensus, including the Canadian Peace Alliance, the Assembly of First Nations, the Canadian Council for International
Cooperation, the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Labour Congress, and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women. 20 At the centre of that report are calls for the radicalization of the notion of security. As the report noted,
One of the most common themes expressed during our hearings was that a true security policy must promote the security of all Canadians, and ultimately of all people. In keeping with this focus, a great many witnesses raised concerns that traditionally have not been considered to be part of security, but which -from a human perspective -clearly do become issues of security. 21 Included within the notion of security were issues of economic justice, equality, the rights of women and Canada's First Nations, and, perhaps most centrally, the "democratization" of security policy. In accordance with the shift in the definition of security, the report proposed a number of concrete reforms, including reforms dealing with parliament and its role. The democratization of security policy was to extend beyond parliamentary reforms, however. It was also to involve greater information" and "regular public hearings" 22 :
It is striking to note to what degree the discursive terms of the counter-consensus on security have entered Ottawa's official lexicon. The clearest evidence of this shift is to be found in the series of public statements made by Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s. Under Axworthy's direction, the notion of "human security" has become a permanent fixture of the department's foreign policy discourse, marking almost every public statement it issues.
In the spring of 1997 Axworthy published an extended set of reflections on the notion of human security in Canada's establishment IR journal: International Journal. Entitled "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership,@ 23 the article merits close examination as it provides an excellent example of how the formerly oppositional discourse on security came to be endorsed by a leading figure in the federal government.
Axworthy begins by noting that the end of the Cold War has not brought the era of unparalleled peace and prosperity initially hoped for. Significantly, he identifies the reason for this failure in the perpetuation of traditional conceptions of security:
The Cold War concept of security emphasized the prevention of interstate conflict in order to avoid the perennial danger of escalation. This strategy focussed on confidence-building measures (to reduce the possibility of an accidental misreading of intentions) and international arms control and disarmament negotiations.
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Echoing the long-standing critique of this notion of security by oppositional spokespersons,
Axworthy concedes that
[i]t is now clear that this approach to security was inadequate to foster stability and peace. Canada ... began to reassess the traditional concept of security in order to identify those variables beyond arms control/ disarmament which affect peace and stability. From this reconsideration emerged the concept of "human security".
Axworthy goes on to echo the counter-consensus notion of human security in specifics as well, affirming that human security is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. The concept of human security recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that the forces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament. It recognizes the links between environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic conflicts, and migration.
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Given the prominence of the notion of "human security" in oppositional demands that the Canadian government rethink its priorities, there is considerable irony in the fact that no acknowledgement was made of the impact of the counter-consensus on official thinking. As
Axworthy presents it, the re-thinking of security was a government initiative occasioned by policymakers' own recognition of the limitations of the traditional notion of security, without reference to considerable energies directed toward this question in oppositional groupings. 26 Still, if the goal of oppositional activity is to influence government thinking in new directions, it is easy to understand how the apparent radical re-orientation of the world-view of a government minister might be celebrated as an unparalleled victory by many within the counter-consensus.
Such celebration would be premature. For while there is no gainsaying the fact that an expanded, non-traditional notion of security now informs the discourse of Foreign Affairs, it must also be recognized that the traditional notion of security has not disappeared -it has simply found a new home elsewhere in the Canadian state.
TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF SECURITY: OLD IDEAS IN A NEW CONTEXT
The traditional notion of security is still to be found in the Canadian government's discourse While it is too soon to say for sure that the crisis is behind us, the recent stability in markets may give us hope that the crisis has at least been contained. As a result, it is time to turn the focus of international policy deliberations from crisis management to crisis avoidance.
Accordingly, he affirmed, it is necessary to find ways of strengthening national and international financial systems by strengthening the "institutional architecture". A key dimension of such an initiative "is the need for greater transparency and disclosure.@ Accordingly, Martin presented a Canadian proposal to establish a new international secretariat to survey financial supervisory systems and identify financial sector problems before they become international crises. AWhat we seek@, he affirmed, A is a secretariat capable of focussing the skills of individual countries and existing international institutions."
Without becoming lost in the specifics of Martin's proposals, it is worth noting how much the underlying assumptions of his initiative conform to the traditional discourse of security. First there is the context for security policy -the "anarchical" international financial system. Then there is the issue of what is to be made secure. In Martin's terms the answer is clear. Not human beings but the interests of the state -specifically, the national financial system -is what needs to be protected. The means to assure its security, meanwhile, is a combination of crisis management and crisis prevention. The former involves the strict application of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, while the latter, typically, will involve confidence-building measures to ensure nationally-based investors have all the information needed to safeguard their assets.
In sum, while the expanded notion of security is in prominent view in current pronouncements from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the traditional notion of security remains very much alive in the discourse of government finance. This raises the question of the relation of these two discourses of security to government policy, as well as to each other.
SECURITY DISCOURSE IN THE NEO-LIBERAL CONTEXT:
The meaning of official discourses on security must be understood in relation to the nature of world order and corresponding Aform of state@ 28 now in existence. Following Cox, the shift from increasingly determinant in virtually all realms, involves a transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy. This process generates consensual guidelines, underpinned by an ideology of globalization, that are transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and big corporations. 29 The shift in world order also involves a corresponding change in the form of state, from the Keynesian welfare state to an "internationalized" state. In the words of Robert Cox:
The structural impact on national governments of this global centralization of influence over policy can be called the internationalizing of the state. Its common feature is to convert the state into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy.
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The changing form of state brings with it a re-ordering of the various parts of the state as well:
Power within the state becomes concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the global economy -the offices of the presidents and prime ministers, treasuries and central banks. The agencies that are most closely identified with domestic clientsministries of industries, labour ministries, and so on -become subordinated.
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The implications of this re-ordering process for our understanding of security discourse are major.
Put bluntly, given the pre-eminent position of finance in the internationalized state and the hyperliberal global order, it is the security discourse of that department which must be understood as most central in the determination of policy, both domestic and foreign. Accordingly, if there is a conflict between the policies deriving from security understood as protecting the interests of economic elites, on the one hand, and security understood as meeting basic human needs, on the other, one would expect the latter to be deferred in the interests of attending to the former.
In point of fact, this is a pattern which has marked Canadian policy formulation and implementation over recent years with predictable results. In domestic terms, neoliberal concerns with combatting deficits and debts as well as inflation -all in order to create attractive conditions for private investment -have come at the cost of human security for the most at risk. Child poverty rates, for example, have sky-rocketed: in the seven years after the House of Commons set a deadline for eliminating child poverty in Canada, half a million more children are living below the poverty line. 32 Internationally as well, it is the traditional notion of security, manifest in the discourse of the Department of Finance, which informs current policies in the international institutions in which Canada participates. Strict implementation of structural adjustment programmes in crisis-ridden countries of the Third World to protect the international investment community is the order of the day, despite the very real human cost in terms of basic human needs. Nor is there any apparent consideration of the probable requirement to escalate state repression to contain public discontent with rapidly falling living standards occasioned by the "tough medicine" meted out by international institutions. The students in Indonesia may see participatory democracy as the solution to their country's problems, but the priority of the Canadian government and its G-7 partners is first and foremost better surveillance and monitoring of the financial context. Democracy, to the degree that it is introduced, will have to be subordinated to the interests and exigencies of international capital. One possibility is to argue that Foreign Affairs retains its traditional importance within the state through its involvement in international economic issues. In Canada, for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs is also responsible for "international trade". 34 The designation is telling, however. International trade is itself a relic of the "international" economy which assumed self-contained states regulating the flows of capital, goods and services across borders. In fact, it can be argued that what marks the hyper-liberal world order of the 1990s is not an "international" but a "world" economy, where state regulation of cross-border flows has been all but dismantled in favour of market forces. As such, the retention of the portfolio of "international trade" marks the marginalization, and not the continued relevance, of the Department of Foreign Affairs in policy terms.
Alternatively, one might re-conceptualize the role of Foreign Affairs in terms of Cox's notion of the "internationalized state" -specifically, in his observation that the "agencies that are most closely identified with domestic clients ... become subordinated.@ In Cox's terms, formerly
AMinistries of industry and ministries of labour used to combine with their respective domestic constituencies to guide and implement national economic policies.@ In the new conditions, however, they play a different role:
These domestic-oriented agencies have in practice been subordinated to ministries of finance and offices of presidents and prime ministers that provide the direct links between world-economy negotiations (through bodies like the OECD, the IMF, and the economic summits) and the development of national policies that implement the national consensus reached in these negotiations. Domestic economic and social interests have as a result been diminished as policy influences. The domestic-oriented agencies of the state are now more and more to be seen as transmission belts from world economy trends and decision making into the domestic economy, as agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no part in deciding. 35 Significantly, it is just this identification with domestic -as opposed to international -clients that distinguishes Foreign Affairs in the current context. In response to the repeated calls from the counter-consensus for the "democratization" of Canadian security policy, the Chrétien government took a number of initiatives, including the creation in 1995 of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, dedicated to ensuring "that the voice of Canadians [will] be heard" in the foreign policy process. 36 Operating with a budget of $1.5 million per year, the main activity of the future claims by stakeholders; it also binds the stakeholders more tightly to the policies eventually adopted. 40 Still, despite parallels with ministries of labour and industry in terms of a strong focus on its domestic constituency, it is not quite right to see Foreign Affairs as playing the exact same role as other domestic-oriented agencies. Following Cox, traditional domestic-oriented agencies of the state are increasingly "transmission belts from world economy trends and decision making into the domestic economy.@ Specifically, the role of these agencies is to translate the needs of the international capital for low inflation, higher profit margins into policies and programmes at the domestic level that will serve these ends -, e.g., high interest rate; lower corporate tax rates, reduced levels of social spending, weakened labour legislation, etc. In other words, the prime function of these agencies is to impose -while simultaneously attempting to justify as the only possible course under the new conditions of globalization -the material costs of neoliberal restructuring.
In contrast, the role of Foreign Affairs is neither to decide policy at the international level (as does Finance) or to implement the material costs of those policies domestically. What then is its role? Once again, official security discourse suggests an answer. In emphasizing Canada's foreign policy efforts to promote human security by improving "international governance through, inter alia, democratization, respect for human rights, and the peaceful resolution of disputes,@ 41 Axworthy has also noted its domestic impact. Specifically, the popular image of Canada pursuing such an orientation contributes to "a uniquely Canadian identity and a sense of Canada's place in the world.@ 42 In short, it can be argued that in the new context, the function of Foreign Affairs is to provide ideological legitimacy to the domestic order as a whole. It does this by underscoring the essentially just and humane nature of Canada's foreign policy, understood in turn as the "natural expression"
of the essentially just and humane political-economic order at home. Domestic policy is the referent to which the sign of foreign policy discourse refers. In sum, in the internationalized state, the function of Foreign Affairs is neither to participate in the international-(ized) decision-making process nor to act as a transmission belt into the domestic economy, but rather to provide a legitimating discourse in support of an increasingly fragile domestic hegemony.
CONCLUSION: CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES -A POLITICAL-ECONOMY APPROACH
The conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion fall into two categories -security discourse and practices in the Canadian case, and implications for Critical Security Studies more generally. In terms of the first, there is a certain irony in Axworthy's promotion of the notion of The irony is, of course, that it has always been a key assumption of mainstream international relations theory that "progress" in pursuit of the "good life" is possible only within the domestic sphere -that the international domain could never be other than the realm of "survival" and the securing of the vital interests of the nation in the anarchical international context. 43 In the brave neoliberal world order, however, we are now instructed that domestic progress toward the good life is a luxury we can no longer afford. The purview of the discourse of progress and the good life has been restricted to the international realm.
to provide a legitimizing discourse to stabilize the domestic politico-economic order. This raises the question of how successful official discourse on human security will provide to be in that regard.
And here one may have serious doubts. First, in Gramscian terms, a stable hegemony is a product of a combination of ideological legitimation coupled with real concessions to subaltern groups (e.g., social welfare provisions). In this case, ideological legitimation must proceed in the presence not of meaningful concessions but of the withdrawal of those concessions (i.e., the dismantling of the welfare state) in accordance with the requirements of "global competitiveness". Even with support from its "stakeholders" in the counter-consensus, ideological legitimation on its own does not a stable hegemony make.
The other reason to question the long-term efficacy of the legitimating power of the discourse of Foreign Affairs is that the price the government must pay in its pursuit of stakeholder politics is the heightening of expectations about what the Canadian state will undertake on the international stage. Indeed, the expectation that Canada will contribute meaningfully to human security has begun to affect even the discourse of the Department of Finance, with Paul Martin publicly acknowledging the dire -though unavoidable (!) -human costs of financial stabilization measures in Asia. Notwithstanding such rhetoric -indeed, to an important degree because of it -the G-7's continued pursuit of "global financial security" to the detriment of "human security" cannot fail to impress upon important segments of the counter-consensus the lack of substance in official discourse. 
